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I. INTRODUCTION
When the bus came up to the turn, just before the highway, the border
patrol car used its lights and sirens to pull the bus over.' It was seven
o'clock and I was on my way to work that morning. This was the third
time I was aboard El Aguila2 when it was stopped. Two armed border
patrol officers boarded the bus and announced that they were going to
check for illegal aliens.4 The officers proceeded to tell every passenger to
present documentation indicating residence or citizenship.' They did not
ask, they demanded.6 I told myself this time it was going to be different
because I would refuse to provide documentation;7 after all, I was a
United States citizen and had the right to remain silent.8 The border pa-
l. Mr. Cantu narrated the events of the stop in an interview; the account, as it ap-
pears, has been edited from the original version. See Telephone Interview by Christopher
McRorie with Mr. Cantu, resident of El Cenizo, Tex. (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter McRorie
Interview with Mr. Cantu]. The names of the residents who were interviewed for this com-
ment were changed to protect their privacy.
2. Most of the habitants of El Cenizo, Texas, use the small county bus called El Aguila
to get to and from worksites in Laredo, Texas. See Telephone Interview by Christopher
McRorie with Jose Gamez, County Director of Rural Transportation (Aug. 19, 1999) [here-
inafter McRorie Interview with Mr. Gamez]. Many also use the bus to get to supermar-
kets, stores, and clinics, which are not available at El Cenizo. See Interview by Christopher
McRorie with Mrs. Diaz, resident of El Cenizo, Tex. (Aug. 1999) [hereinafter McRorie
Interview with Mrs. Diaz.





8. See id. For purposes of this Comment, the author is asserting that the stops of El
Aguila constitute a seizure. As such, a person's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent is
invoked. See U.S. CoNsT. amend V. "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself. . ."; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
[Vol. 2:289
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trol officers did not take my exercise of rights well; they hassled and in-
sulted me until they were convinced that I was a United States citizen.9
This account is from a resident of El Cenizo,10 a small community lo-
cated outside Laredo, Texas, and along the United States-Mexico bor-
der." Many of the residents of El Cenizo ride a small county bus called
El Aguila to get to and from work everyday.'
2
El Aguila is the target of random border patrol stops. "The stops occur
on the highway, in the city, everywhere, but never at regularly scheduled
stops."' 3 Once stopped, border patrol officers demand documentation
from everyone in the bus, 4 notwithstanding the fact that most passengers
are United States citizens or permanent residents.' 5 The passengers are
all checked, and everyone who does not have documentation or who re-
fuses to show documentation is told to get off the bus. 6 These passen-
gers must convince the officers that they have a right to be in the United
States, even if they profess to be citizens.' 7 The bus does not take off
until all have been checked and all have presented documents showing
that they are citizens or residents of the United States.'" The stops can
9. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1.
10. Although the analysis will focus on the stops in El Cenizo of El Aguila, the com-
munity reflects the diverse population of United States citizens, legal permanent residents,
and immigrants in cities along the United States-Mexico Border.
11. See David McLemore, S. Texas Town Adopts Spanish, Bans Cooperation with INS
(visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.usbc.orgfinfolcitusaltexastownspanish.htm> (relating
that El Cenizo is made up of modest houses located about 10 miles down the river from
Laredo).
12. See id. Most of El Cenizo residents have household incomes falling below the
poverty lines thus requiring them to take the bus to and from Laredo. See id.
13. McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2.
14. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1.; McRorie Interview with
Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2.
15. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1 (stating that the three stops
combined resulted in the arrest of only two or three undocumented passengers). From
this, one can infer that the rest of the passengers, the majority, were United States citizens
or lawful permanent residents.
16. See McRorie Interview with Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2. She was told to exit the bus
along with others, and was asked by three different officers whether she was a United
States citizen, and all three times she was asked whether she was sure she was a citizen.
See id.; McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1 (stating that he was hassled when
he refused to show documentation proving he was a United States citizen).
17. See McRorie Interview with Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2; see also McRorie Interview
with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1.
18. See McRorie Interview with Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2 (noting that the bus is
delayed because people who do not show proper documentation are forced to exit the bus
and are not allowed back on until they properly show that they are citizens or residents).
20001
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last from twenty to forty-five minutes, which frequently make the passen-
gers late to work. 19
The Border patrol's procedure of randomly stopping El Aguila to
search for illegal aliens violates the constitutional right of United States
citizens and legal permanent residents to travel free from governmental
intrusion. ° The border patrol officers justification for this extravagant
license to stop is the immigration laws, which on their face allow them to
board a bus and question the passengers about their right to be in the
United States.2 1 Yet, United States citizens and legal permanent resi-
dents maintain that immigration laws cannot be interpreted to allow ran-
dom seizures and over-inclusive questioning by roving patrols.
This Comment will demonstrate how roving patrols that randomly stop
buses between El Cenizo and Laredo, Texas, violate the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of United States citizens and legal permanent residents who
live along the U.S.-Mexico border. Part II of this comment presents the
federal authority to regulate immigration at the border, specifically defin-
ing the standard of reasonable suspicion applicable to roving patrols,
which was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1975. Part III, defines the
stops of El Aguila as seizures requiring the officers to meet the standard
of reasonable suspicion. In Part IV, this Comment analyzes the question-
ing on board El Aguila using the law on voluntary police encounters con-
cluding that border patrol does not meet the required standard of
reasonable suspicion. Moreover, finding that the procedure of stopping
El Aguila and detaining its occupants is an unreasonable seizure. Finally,
this comment proposes setting up a Citizen Review Board, which would
operate in communities along the Texas-Mexico border. The Civilian Re-
view Board would monitor the procedures adopted by INS and provide
an intermediary structure in the complaint process, thereby providing a
remedy against overbearing border patrol procedures.
II. FEDERAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE IMMIGRATION
AT THE BORDER
The power to regulate immigration is delegated by Congress to the At-
torney General, who in turn has empowered the Immigration and Natu-
19. See McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2.
20. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273-74 (1973) (stating that
the Court should not forget that these people have indispensable freedoms and not second-
class rights).
21. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 287 (a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)
(1994) (giving border patrol officers the power to board a conveyance within a reasonable
distance from the external border to search for undocumented people).
[Vol. 2:289
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ralization Service (INS) with the authority to enforce immigration laws. 2
INS is mandated to place border patrol officers at the international bor-
der to detect illegal aliens trying to come into the United States in addi-
tion to illegal activity taking place within a reasonable distance from the
border.23
In order to carry out their enforcement activities, the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) authorizes INS officers to exercise certain powers
without a search or arrest warrant.24 For instance, INS officers have the
power, without a warrant, to question "any alien or person believed to be
an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States," within a
reasonable distance from the border.2 The officers have the power to
board and search for aliens in any aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle within
a reasonable distance from the external border to search for undocu-
mented people.2 The Attorney General has defined the reasonable dis-
tance as that area within 100 miles from the border.27
A. Permanent Checkpoints and Temporary Checkpoints
Away from the border, the border patrol conducts three types of inland
traffic-checking operations in an effort to detect smugglers and control
illegal immigration. 8 These operations include permanent checkpoints,
temporary checkpoints, and roving patrols.29
22. See id § 1357(a)(1); see also Alineida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272 (quoting The Chi-
nese Exclusion Case to hold that the Federal government has the plenary power to exclude
undocumented people and thus pass laws regulating immigration) SrE'HEN H. LEGo.t.
SKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFuGEE LAW AND PoucY 535 (2d ed. 1997).
23. See FEDERAL IMMIGRATION LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE SoUnTs-r. CIVIL
RIGHTS IMPACTS ON BORDER COMMUNITIEs 8 (1997) (stating that the border patrol has
expanded from patrolling the border to preventing illegal immigration); The United States
Border Patrol (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http.//usbp.com/usbpl.htm>; see generally Rebecca
Chiao, Fourth Amendment Limits on Immigration Law Enforcement IwutIGR. BRIEFINGS,
Feb. 1993 at 1, 11, 12 (stating that border patrol officers operate to control the incoming
traffic from the international border as well as undocumented aliens or illegal activity tak-
ing place in the interior).
24. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 287(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1994);
LEGOMSKY, supra note 22.
25. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 287(a)(1). 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1)
(1994).
26. See id. § 1357(a)(3).
27. See 8 C.F.R. 287.1(a)(2) (1999) (noting that the code refers to -air" miles or any
shorter distance fixed by the district director); see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31,
39 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975); Ahneida-Sanchez, 413
U.S. at 266.
28. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 552 (1976); Alrneida-Sanchez,
413 U.S. at 268.
29. See Martinez-Fuerte 428 U.S. at 552; Almneida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.
2000]
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Conducted in a similar manner, permanent checkpoints and temporary
checkpoints consist of routine inquiries regarding citizenship, immigra-
tion status, and suspicious circumstances.3" Operated miles away from
the border, motorists are alerted about the established checkpoints by
signs, flashing lights, and orange traffic cones.3'
Because motorists have knowledge of the location of the checkpoint
and only those cars passing through the checkpoint may be checked,32 the
Court has concluded that routine checkpoint inquiries do not require any
standard of suspicion.33 The Supreme Court has furnished border patrol
officers the discretion to stop and question motorists at checkpoints, as
these are considered functional equivalents to the international border.34
B. Roving Patrols
The third form of traffic-checking operation, roving patrols, is used to
supplement the checkpoints system in intercepting illegal entrants and
detecting smuggling operations. 35  Roving patrols involve INS officers
that stop and question motorists miles away from the border on roads
and highways in the same way police officers apprehend traffic viola-
tors.36 Because roving patrol officers look for criminal activity, both alien
smuggling and contraband smuggling,37 roving patrols lose their adminis-
trative nature and are treated differently from checkpoint stops.
38
30. See, e.g., Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-58; United States v. Hernandez, 7 F.3d
944, 946 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence allows for this line
of questioning); United States v. Ludlow, 992 F.2d 260, 265 (10th Cir. 1993).
31. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 545-46; United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 893
(1975); United States v. Davis, 141 F. 3d 1180, 1998 WL 133479. at **1-**2 (9th Cir. 1998).
32. See Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895 (inferring that checkpoint stops are less intrusive be-
cause motorists can see that other vehicles are being stopped); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at
559.
33. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 562 (finding that there is no need for individual-
ized suspicion at permanent checkpoints); Christine L. Vigliotti, Note, Gonzalez-Rivera v.
INS: An Unwarranted Application of the Exclusionary Rule to Civil Deportation Hearings,
40 VILL. L. REv 1133, 1142 (1995).
34. See Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 896-97; United States V. Maestas, 2 F.3d 1485, 1494-95 (10th
Cir. 1993); Rebecca Chiao, supra note 23, at 12 (stating that all persons are subject to
questioning regarding immigration status at border equivalents). Permanent checkpoints,
temporary checkpoints and airports are considered border equivalents. See id. at 8.
35. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 552.
36. See Rebecca Chiao, supra note 23, at 12.
37. See United States v. Boruff, 909 F.2d 111, 117 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that roving
patrol officers may stop vehicles when they have reasonable suspicion of drug smuggling or
illegal aliens); United States v. Monsisvais, 907 F.2d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1990).
38. See Michigan Police Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990)
(distinguishing checkpoints from roving patrols); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,
462 U.S. 579, 587 (1983) (distinguishing roving patrols as not part of the functional
equivalents of the border); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975);
[Vol. 2:289
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In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,39 the Court concluded that roving
patrol officers needed to adhere to a higher standard.4" Rather than the
broad and unlimited discretion conferred on border patrol officers to stop
and question at the border and its equivalents, roving patrol officers must
have reasonable suspicion.41 Applying a balancing test, the Court found
that the requirement of 'reasonable suspicion' allowed the government
sufficient means to safeguard the public interest while also protecting in-
habitants of border areas from random official intrusion.4 2
The government asserted that roving patrols could conduct routine
stops based solely on the Mexican appearance or ancestry of the passen-
gers.43 The government claimed that they were authorized under the
INA to question anyone believed to be an alien and to board and search
for aliens within an aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle. 
4
Although persuaded by the government's alleged need for flexibility in
implementing effective procedures to prevent undocumented immigra-
tion,45 the Court found that immigration laws could not be interpreted as
allowing roving patrols the power to make routine stops when there was
no reason to believe the passengers were undocumented immigrants."
The Court took into account that a large amount of legitimate traffic
might be subject to these stops47 and the grave danger that such unre-
viewable discretion would be abused by some of the officers.48 The Court
feared that roving patrols would stop motorists at random for question-
ing, "on a city street, a busy highway, or a desert road, without any reason
to suspect that they have violated any law."4 9 Therefore, random stops of
vehicles by roving patrols would not be tolerated, because to do so would
subject border area residents to potentially unlimited infringement with
United States v. Venzor-Castillo, 991 F.2d 634, 637 (10th Cir. 1993) (indicating that roving
patrol officers operating miles from the border are not a functional equivalent of the
border).
39. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
40. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882-83.
41. See id; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543, 562-63 (1976) (acknowl-
edging that criteria used to conduct inspections at the border checkpoints would not be
sustained when referring to roving patrols).
42. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883.
43. See id. at 877.
44. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 287 (a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3)
(1994); Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 877.
45. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878, Kevin R. Johnson, Race Profiling in Immigra-
tion Enforcement, 14 (on file with The Scholar: St. Man's Law Review on Minority Issues).
46. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884.
47. See id. at 882.
48. See id. at 882-83.
49. 1d. at 883.
2000]
7
Ortiz: The Dangers of Unguarded Discretion
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2000
THE SCHOLAR
their use of public roadways.5" The Court decided that the Fourth
Amendment prohibited roving border patrols from stopping a vehicle
near the Mexican border and questioning its occupants as to their immi-
gration status when the only ground for suspicion was that the occupants
appear to be of Mexican ancestry.5' The Court held that appearing to be
Mexican while in close proximity to the Mexican border was not suffi-
cient to constitute a 'reasonable suspicion' that immigration laws were
being violated.52
While the Court forbade roving patrol officers from stopping vehicles
on the appearance of Mexican ancestry alone, it deemed Mexican appear-
ance a relevant factor. 3 The Court included Mexican ancestry in a list of
relevant factors to be considered when carrying out a stop.54 Such rele-
vant factors include characteristics of the area, specifically its proximity to
the border;55 information about recent illegal border crossing in the
area;56 a driver's behavior;57 the type of vehicle and the characteristic
appearance of persons who live in Mexico;58 and other factors such as
mode of dress and haircut.59 The Brignoni-Ponce factors have been criti-
cized for their subjectivity in allowing officers to rely on opinions of what
illegal aliens might look like.6"
1. Reasonable Suspicion
The standard of reasonable suspicion requires that roving patrol of-
ficers be aware of 'specific articulable facts' which, taken together with
rational inferences, reasonably warrant suspicion that a vehicle contains
illegal aliens.61 This means that the officer must be able to point to the
facts that formed the basis of his reasonable suspicion for making the
50. See id. at 882.
51. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-86.
52. See id. at 886-87.
53. See id. 886-87 (stating that the "likelihood that any given person of Mexican ances-
try is an alien is high enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor").
54. See id. at 884-86.
55. See id. 884-85.
56. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885.
57. See id. at 885.
58. See id. at 885.
59. See id. at 884-85.
60. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, Comment, The Rule of Egregiousness: INS v. Lopez-Men-
doza Reconsidered, 19 WHITrER L. REV. 843, 850-51 (1998).
61. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-82; Randall S. Susskind, Race Reasonable Ar-
ticulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 327, 329 (1994). See generally Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires an officer to
point to "specific and articulable facts" before an intrusion is found to be warranted).
[Vol. 2:289
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stop.62 The standard of reasonable suspicion entails a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop; it requires more than a hunch
but less than probable cause.6 3 Specifically, border patrol officers must
be able to point to facts that suggest the vehicle they are about to detain
holds undocumented persons, otherwise the stop equals an unreasonable
seizure.64
Subsequent decisions affirm that the standard of 'reasonable suspicion'
must protect innocent individuals from becoming the target of overbear-
ing police procedures executed on the basis of subjective stereotypes of
what undocumented persons look like, or on the basis of characteristics
such as race.65 This is significant for United States citizens and permanent
residents living near the border where they are subject to stops solely on
the basis of their appearance.66 As such, stopping a vehicle solely on the
basis that the passengers appear Mexican is an unreasonable seizure and
should not be tolerated.67
Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the reasonable suspicion
standard as applied by INS,68 notwithstanding the fact that the standard
of reasonable suspicion fails to determine which factor must be ascer-
tained by roving patrol officers when making the stop.69 Consequently,
62. See Chiao, supra note 23, at 3 (discussing the 'specific and articulable facts' stan-
dard); Susskind, supra note 61, at 329 (stating that the reasonable suspicion standard de-
mands specificity in the information relied upon by the officer for making a stop).
63. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1.7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 30
(1968) (categorizing reasonable suspicion as an intermediate level of suspicion, which al-
lows a police officer to detain for a reasonable time to investigate without first obtaining a
warrant); Susskind, supra note 61, at 329.
64. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884; Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F. 3d 1441, 1447-
48 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a stop based solely on the Hispanic appearance of an indi-
vidual is an unreasonable stop); United States v. Medina-Gasca, 739 F.2d 1451, 1453 (9th
Cir. 1984); United States v. Ogilvie, 527 F.2d 330, 331 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that border
patrol officers need "founded suspicion" to make a stop).
65. See Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 12; see also United States v. Thomas, 787 F. Supp. 663,
676 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
66. See generally Nadine Epstein, HISPANICS: Under the Suspicious Eye of Border
Agents, THE CHSMMiAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Apr. 14, 1988, at 16 (relating the story of a
Jose Luis Castillo, a United States citizen law student who was stopped because he was of
Mexican ancestry;, he was short and dark, fitting the description of most "illegal
Mexicans").
67. See Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d at 704; Christine L Vigliotti, supra note 33, at 1142.
68. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555-56 (1976).
69. See Andrew Jay Flame, Criminal Procedure-Drug Courier Profiles and Terr'-
Type Seizures-United States v. Hooper, 935 F.2d 484 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 663
(1991), 65 TEMP. L. REv. 323, 336-37 (1991) (noting that there are numerous subjective
factors that go into the analysis of reasonable suspicion).
200]
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courts must evaluate the "totality of the circumstances"7 of each particu-
lar case in deciding whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make
the stop.7 The lack of an objective standard at the outset allows roving
patrol officers to create a justification after the stop has been made or
when the lawfulness of the stop is under judicial scrutiny.
7 2
2. Application of Reasonable Suspicion Standard
While the reasonable suspicion standard is supposed to protect United
States citizens and legal permanent resident of Hispanic descent, as ap-
plied it allows roving patrols to violate Fourth Amendment rights of
Americans of Hispanic descent.73 By allowing factors that center around
Hispanic appearance, the standard allows the border patrol to make a
stop based on their subjective notion of what an undocumented immi-
grant looks like.74 Factors like dress and appearance become a substitute
for race, while the type of vehicle becomes an alternative for class.75
Other factors like "characteristics of the area" and "information about
recent illegal crossings" have been found to be invalid because they were
considered too broad.76
Because roving patrol officers are allowed to factor appearance when
deciding to stop, they often engage in a pattern of unlawful stops to ques-
70. The courts examine whether based on the "whole picture," detaining officers had
a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a certain individual of illegal activity.
See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981).
71. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 703 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (not-
ing that reasonable suspicion as probable cause demands a fact-intensive review); United
States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d
716, 722 (5th Cir. 1994) (affirming that standard of reasonable suspicion is a fact intensive
review that demands each case be examined from the totality of the circumstances).
72. See Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1443 (9th Cir. 1994) (giving account of
officers unjustified factors for stopping Gonzalez and his father). The officers stated that
although there was nothing suspicious about the vehicle, they had relied on the fact that
the two men appeared to be Hispanic, failed to acknowledge the officers, and that Gonza-
lez had a dry mouth and was "blinking." See id. at 1443. The court rejected, as a matter of
law, the factors relied on by the roving patrol. See id. at 1446. The court concluded that
factors were an attempt to justify an unreasonable stop made solely on the basis of race.
See id. at 1447-48; see also Flame, supra note 69, at 336-37 (stating that subjectively scored
factors in a drug courier profile make it easier for an officer to manipulate the factors in
order meet the reasonable suspicion standard). As with immigration stops based on a pas-
senger's appearance, an officer's potential biases to influence conclusions and potential
post-seizure fabrication of facts is inherently present. See generally U.S. v. Rodriguez, 976
F.2d 592, 595 (9th Cir. 1992).
73. See Hafetz, supra note 60, at 847-48.
74. See Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F. 3d 1441, 1447-48 (9th Cir. 1994); Hafetz, supra
note 60, at 848.
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tion persons of Hispanic appearance.' Officers rely on subjective feel-
ings,78 which do not provide any rational basis for separating
undocumented immigrants from United States citizens and legal resi-
dents.7 9 On the border where the population is overwhelmingly His-
panic, people believe that everyone is a target, even those with legal
status, such as County Judge Hinojosa.s° Judge Hinojosa was stopped
and questioned about his citizenship. 8 In addition, Border patrol pulled
over Federal District Judge Filemon Vela in Brownsville, Texas, and
asked about his citizenship when officers mistook him for an illegal
alien.' While driving on an isolated road, Judge Vela along with three of
his aides was stopped. 3 According to the border patrol agent, there were
too many people in the car.'
III. THE SEIZURES OF EL A GuImA
When roving patrols pull over El Aguila on the open highway or inside
El Cenizo,85 officers seize the passengers on the bus. 6 Therefore, the
Fourth Amendment requires that officers meet the standard of reason-
able suspicion applicable to roving patrols stops.8
77. In Nicacio v. INS, a class of people of Hispanic appearance brought action against
the INS following INS practice of engaging in a pattern of unlawful stops to question per-
sons of Hispanic appearance. See Nicacio v. INS. 797 F.2d at 701. The plaintiffs asserted
that they had experienced repeated stops and would continue to be subjected to these
stops as they continued traveling by car on the highways of Washington. See id. at 700.
78. See id 705. The officer stated: "[w]e have been around and just from experience
we can tell who is illegal and who is not. Sometimes it's an air about a person or the way
he looks, or carries himself, but its kind of hard to just say right off". Id. The Chief Patrol
Agent also testified that officers looked for other factors like a "hungry look" or a person's
age when making the stop. Id. at 704.
79. See i. at 705.
80. Jim Yardley, Some Texans Say Border Patrol Singles Out Too Many Blameless
Hispanics, N. Y. Tnvms, Jan. 26, 2000, at A17.
81. See Inadmissible. Judicial Detention, Tax. L.Aw., June 21, 1999 at 3 (discussing how
Cameron County Judge Gilberto Hinojosa was stopped at the Harlingen Airport by border
patrol agents). Judge Hinojosa responded by asserting his right to remain silent. See id.





85. See McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2 (stating that "stops occur
on the highway, in the city, everywhere).
86. See generally English v. Sava, 571 F. Supp. 1029, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (concluding
that the procedure of diverting a bus and the questioning of its passengers amounted to a
seizure).
87. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (stating that roving
patrols have to be aware of "specific articulable" facts that, taken together with rational
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A. The Fourth Amendment Protection on Seizures
Courts have uniformly held in light of relevant circumstances that
Fourth Amendment protections are invoked whenever a person is
seized.8" The courts recognize that a seizure occurs when an officer stops
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away. 9 Seizures involve
some termination of movement, which range from forceful arrests to brief
detentions.9" The Court has found that stopping a vehicle and detaining
its occupants constitutes a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 91
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, any restraint on a person
amounting to a seizure is invalid unless justified by probable cause.'
Terry v. Ohio9 3 created a narrow exception to this general rule. Certain
seizures are justifiable if the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity.94 Relying on Terry, the Supreme Court extended the exception
of reasonable suspicion to roving patrol stops.
95
inferences, reasonably warrant suspicion that undocumented aliens are traveling in the
vehicle).
88. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988); United States v. Mancil-
las, 183 F.3d 682, 701 n.22 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. DeBerry, 76 F.3d 884, 885-86
(7th Cir. 1996); see also Susskind, supra 330.
89. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968); see also Brower v. Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 598-
99 (1989) (defining a seizure as the termination of the freedom to move by the very instru-
mentality set in motion to achieve that result); United States v. Marin, 669 F.2d 73, 81 (2d
Cir. 1982).
90. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16 (asserting that a "seizure" does not have to necessarily
constitute "a trip to the station"); Chiao, supra note 23, at 2-3 (defining seizures as deten-
tions which can range from incarceration to brief detentions).
91. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440
U.S. 648, 653 (1979).
92. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 207-09 (1979).
93. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
94. The Court held that police officers could "stop and frisk" an individual without a
warrant or probable cause granted that the encounter was kept brief and justified by rea-
sonable suspicion. See Terry, 392 U.S. at, 27-30; see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411,418 (1981) (establishing that reasonable inferences drawn by an officer when making a
stop should be evaluated to determine if the whole picture rises to the level of "particular-
ized suspicion" of criminal activity of person being stopped); United States v. Ramos, 753
F. Supp. 75, 78 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (citing Terry v. Ohio, citation omitted) (affirming that
there must be "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before a person can be stopped").
95. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975) (finding that the
Fourth Amendment prohibits stopping vehicles or detaining persons absent the reasonable
suspicion that they may be aliens); see also United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976).
[Vol. 2:289
12
The Scholar: St. Mary's Law Review on Race and Social Justice, Vol. 2 [2000], No. 2, Art. 18
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thescholar/vol2/iss2/18
UNCONSTITUTIONAL STOPS
B. Reasonable Suspicion Required for Stopping El Aguila
Executing a stop on a whole bus likewise results in a seizure of its occu-
pants.96 The stopping and questioning conducted on El Aguila arguably
affects the passengers' ability to disregard the presence of the officers and
reach their designated stops.97 Therefore, the border patrol cannot stop
El Aguila or conduct routine spot checks of bus passengers without rea-
sonable suspicion that the passengers are illegally present or are commit-
ting another unlawful activity.9 8 Although the Court has not addressed
the required level of suspicion needed to detain a whole bus, the reasons
articulated by the Court for adopting the reasonable suspicion standard
for vehicle stops are indistinguishable from bus stops by roving patrols.
The Supreme Court noted the overall degree of interference with legit-
imate traffic involved in vehicle stops.99 With the increases in lawful im-
migration, the interference with legitimate motorists has only grown since
the implementation of standards on roving patrols. Furthermore, this
same precaution taken by the Court with regards to legitimate traffic
should apply to stops of buses. United States citizens and legal perma-
nent residents are often forced to use buses as transportation to get to
different places. To approve a roving patrol stop of a bus, without rea-
sonable suspicion subjects large numbers of United States citizens and
permanent residents to potentially unlimited intrusion with highway use,
entirely at the disposition of border patrol officers. 10'
Moreover, by adopting a reasonable suspicion standard, the Court
sought to guard against random stops by roving patrols, which are in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment.' 01 As we observe with the stops of El
96. See English v. Sava, 571 F. Supp 1029, 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
97. Compare United States v. Gonzales, 979 F.2d 711. 713 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that
the border procedure of boarding a Greyhound bus did not affect the passengers ability to
ignore officers and continue with their trip because the officer boarded the bus at a desig-
nated stop and questioned the individual while the bus continued on its way), with
McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1.
98. The Courts have found that the border patrol must have individualized suspicion
that a particular vehicle is engaged in illegal activity before stopping. See, e.g., United
States v. Moreno-Chaparro, 157 F.3d 298, 301 (5th Cir. 1998) (summarizing the statement
of a border patrol agent by relaying that -it would be manifestly unreasonable to target
every Chevy in Texas"); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592, 596 (9th Cir. 1992)
(stressing the need for "particular, individualized, objectively observable factors" for each
case).
99. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882.
100. See generally McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2.
101. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559 (1976); Bngnoni-Ponce,
422 U.S. at 884.
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Aguila, United States citizens and permanent residents are subject to un-
restrained intrusions at random times.1
0 2
Courts need to adopt the standard of reasonable suspicion for all stops
executed by roving patrol at places other than the border and its
equivalents. While there is a persuasive argument for apprehending ille-
gal immigrants and reducing illegal immigration, 0 3 the standard of rea-
sonable suspicion allows some protection against the random stops of
those lawfully in the United States. 1°4
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF BEING ABOARD A Bus
A. Consensual Police Encounters
While the Supreme Court has not addressed the standard of suspicion
needed to stop a bus,'0 5 the Court has addressed what procedures are
allowed once border patrol officers lawfully board a bus." ° Based on the
law of police encounters, officers may question individual passengers
aboard a bus without implicating the Fourth Amendment and without
having to meet any standard of reasonable suspicion.0 7 As long as the
police encounter is based on consent and there are no intimidating cir-
cumstances demonstrating an absence of consent, the interrogation is
considered a voluntary encounter that does not invoke Fourth Amend-
ment protections.
10 8
1. Florida v. Bostick
In Florida v. Bostick,1 9 the precedent case on the issue of police en-
counters and seizures, the Supreme Court examined police interrogations
within the cramped confines of a bus." 0 The Court reviewed whether
102. See McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2 (noting that the stops are
random and occur everywhere except at regularly scheduled stops).
103. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878 (1975) (stating that the government made a
persuasive showing that public interest called for effective measures in preventing illegal
immigration).
104. See id. (noting that despite the relatively minor interference occasioned by roving
patrol stops, the public should be protected from this indiscriminate governmental
interference).
105. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
106. See generally id. at 429.
107. See generally id. at 439-40; see also United States v. Gonzales, 979 F.2d 711, 713
(9th Cir. 1992).
108. See generally id. at 434; INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216 (1984); see also United
States v. Anderson, 663 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States v. Menden-
hall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
109. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
110. See id. at 433.
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such an encounter constituted a "seizure" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment."' In Bostick, officers engaged in drug interdiction
efforts boarded a bus and without articulable suspicion approached Mr.
Bostick, a passenger, and asked to look at his ticket and search his bag."'
The Supreme Court noted that the police never threatened Bostick with a
gun and they advised Bostick he had a right to refuse consent to a
search." 3 The Court found that although the man was not free to leave
the bus, since the aisle was blocked, he had been free to ignore the of-
ficer's request to see what was in his bag, and therefore the encounter
was consensual rather than a detention.'
4
B. Police Encounters that Amount to a Seizure
Under some circumstances, mere questioning, done in the context of a
police encounter, can amount to a detention that invokes the Fourth
Amendment's requirement of reasonable suspicion.115 A detention oc-
curs when intimidating circumstances demonstrate an absence of con-
sent.1 6 Such circumstances can range from the "threatening presence of
several officers, the display of weapons by an officer, physical contact
with the person, or coercive language." '17
1. "Free to Leave" Test
Courts have developed a test, commonly referred to as the "free to
leave" test to determine whether a police encounter amounts to a
seizure. 1 8 A seizure occurs when the actions of the officers leads a rea-
111. See iL at 433.
112. See id at 431-32.
113. See id at 432.
114. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); Gonzales, 979 F.2d at 712-13
(stating that boarding a bus to investigate immigration status pursuant to an agreement
between the bus company and border patrol, and initiating conversation with a passenger
to see whether he was an illegal alien was a permissible encounter, not seizure).
115. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,215 (1984) (stating that a consensual encounter
can transform to a seizure when the person believes they are not free to leave); Mendoza v.
INS, 559 F. Supp. 842, 847 (W.D. Tex 1982); Chiao, supra note 23, at 3-4.
116. See Delgado, 466 U.S. at 216 (stating that -unless the circumstances of the en-
counter are so intimidating as to demonstrate that a reasonable person would have be-
lieved he was not free to leave if he had not responded, one cannot say that the questioning
resulted in a detention"); see also Mendoza, 559 F. Supp. at 846 (stating that a -person has
been seized when it becomes clear to him that an officer has restrained his liberty to move
about by means of physical force or show of authority").
117. Chiao, supra note 23, at 3.
118. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
2000]
15
Ortiz: The Dangers of Unguarded Discretion
Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2000
THE SCHOLAR
sonable person to believe that he was not free to walk away, or to refuse
to answer questions, given the totality of the circumstances." 9
The "free to leave" test focuses on whether the reasonable person is
free to decline the police encounter given the circumstances of the
stop.' If the individual answers the questions asked by the border pa-
trol officer, the court then examines whether the individual consented
voluntarily or was forced to consent because of intimidating
circumstances.' 2 '
Courts have recognized that the voluntariness of consent is a question
of fact to be determined from an assessment of the totality of all the cir-
cumstances.' 22 Courts, for the most part, analyze whether the circum-
stances of the stop were so intimidating that an innocent reasonable
person believed he/she had no choice but to cooperate.'" Usually, no
single factor is dispositive; rather, courts look to the totality of the cir-
cumstances. 2 4 Moreover, courts examine the factors that suggest the use
of physical force or show of authority by an officer during the encounter,
thus restraining the liberty of the passenger."a These factors include the
display of authority by government officials 1 26 or threatening presence of
several officers12 7 that would affect the ability of the passengers to go
about their business.
128
V. ANALYSIS OF THE STOPS AT EL CENIZO
In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment requirements, border patrol
officers must establish that the stop was lawful, and that officers boarding
119. See id. at 545 ; see also California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991) (stating
that as long as a reasonable person feels free to disregard the police and go about their
business, the encounter is consensual).
120. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554.
121. See id. at 554 (stating that courts evaluate factors that indicate compliance with
officers' request might have been compelled); Chiao, supra note 23, at 10 (stating that the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of weapons by an officer, physical con-
tact with the person, or coercive language, or tone of voice were all factors in determining
whether a seizure occurred or whether there was freedom to leave).
122. See Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248-49 (1973).
123. See id. at 248 (stating that to justify a search on the basis of voluntarily consent,
must prove that it was not the result of coercion, express or implied).
124. See id. at 226 (stating that the court must look to "all the surrounding circum-
stances, both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the encounter).
125. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434.
126. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (stating that the coercive
effect of police conduct must be assessed along with distinct details of that conduct).
127. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968)
(listing other factors such as physical touching, the use of language, or tone of voice to
imply that compliance was compelled)).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 979 F.2d 711, 713 (9th Cir. 1992).
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and questioning passengers on El Aguila were merely involved in a con-
sensual police encounter.129 If the questioning escalated to a seizure,
border patrol officers must establish that they had reasonable suspicion to
stop and question all passengers on El Aguila.t30 The facts regarding the
stops of El Aguila must be evaluated using the "free to leave" test, look-
ing closely at the circumstances surrounding the stop and questioning by
the officers.
131
A. Detentive Questioning on Board El Aguila
1. Intimidating Circumstances
The courts examine whether the individual was forced to consent based
upon intimidating circumstances.1 32 In evaluating the circumstances of El
Aguila stops, we note that roving patrol officers randomly stop buses on
the highway.' 33 The armed officers board the cramped confines of the
bus.'" They question everyone on board about their immigration status
and demand documents from all passengers.13 5 Although the Court in
Bostick deemed that carrying guns alone does not constitute a display of
authority,' 36 having officers board a bus in full uniform, displaying their
badges and either blocking the aisles or asking the passengers to get off, is
an intimidating situation that leads a reasonable person to submit to au-
129. See generally United States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 146 (5th Cir. 1995) (stating
that the initial contact of officers boarding the bus and questioning passengers was consti-
tutional as long as a reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the
encounter).
130. See iid. at 146; Mendoza v. INS, 559 F. Supp. 842, 846 (W.D. Tex. 1982): Chiao,
supra note 23, at 10.
131. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439-40 (noting that to determine whether a police en-
counter escalated to a seizure a court must consider all the circumstances of the stop and
whether a reasonable person would have felt they could decline the encounter, United
States v. Garcia, 909 F. Supp. 334, 336 (D. Md 1995) (stating that a court must consider
circumstances surrounding the stop and whether a person would have felt free to terminate
the encounter).
132. See Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 (acknowledging that factors surrounding the in-
timidating circumstances include the threatening presence of officers, display of weapons,
tone of voice and content of statements must be evaluated in determining compliance was
forced); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. at 210. 215 (1984) (noting that questioning by officers
amounts to a seizure when there are intimidating circumstances surrounding the stop);
United States v. Anderson, 39 F.3d 331 (1995).
133. See McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2 (explaining the stops oc-
cur on the highway, city; "everywhere, but never at regularly scheduled stops").
134. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu. supra note 1.
135. See it.
136. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 439 (inferring that guns alone are not despositive in
evaluating what constitutes a display of authority).
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thority.13 7 This is particularly true for passengers of El Aguila, who are
Hispanics who believe they are the targets of the border patrol.
138
2. Submission is not Consent
Many passengers of El Aguila do not know that they can exercise the
right to remain silent or walk away when border patrol officers question
them. Because passengers on El Aguila will not exercise these Fifth
Amendment rights, officers will more than likely rely on the Supreme
Court's analysis in Bostick and claim that the passengers choose to coop-
erate, making the stop a voluntary police encounter. 3 9 However, in Bos-
tick the Court noted that police had advised the passenger of his right to
refuse consent, a warning that is not offered to El Aguila passengers.
As suggested by the dissent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,"4 ° the con-
tention that passengers consent voluntarily implies that they know they
have the option of withholding consent. 4 ' However, by not informing
the passengers that they have a choice the border patrol unjustly forces
passengers to relinquish a constitutional right to be free from unreasona-
ble searches and seizure.142 Justice Marshall, in Schneckloth, introduced
the notion that officers should inform passengers of their Fifth Amend-
ment right to refuse consent or remain silent, rights that officers are
aware passengers possess.1 43 He suggests that not informing the passen-
137. See id. at 446-47 (pointing out the fact that officers wearing bright green raid
jackets, uniforms and displaying their badges on a bus is an intimidating show of
authority).
138. Because minorities, in this case Hispanics, are often targeted by the border pa-
trol, they may feel more pressure to answer, thereby having their liberty constrained. See
Kathleen M. O'Day, Comment, Pretextual Traffic Stops: Protecting Our Streets from Racist
Police Tactics? 23 U. DAYTON L. REV. 313, 325 (1998); see also Nadine Epstein, HISPAN-
ICS: Under the Suspicious Eye of Border Agents, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 14,
1988, at 16 (commenting that the experiences with border patrol led Joe Louis Castillo, a
United States citizen law student, to comment that the border patrol is a "private police
force for Hispanics"); Yardley, supra note 80 (quoting Judge Hinojosa, who stated that
stops were a daily part of life for people living at the border).
139. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447 (inferring that because the individual failed to get off
the bus, he had consented to the encounter); see also Hunter v. State, 955 S.W. 2d. 102, 108
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997). In accordance with the Bostick ruling, the Harper Court states
that no detention occurs provided an officer clearly communicates that an individual is not
required to consent).
140. 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 277 (stating "the capacity to choose necessarily depends upon knowl-
edge that there is a choice to be made").
142. See id. at 277.
143. See id 284-85 (opining that lack of knowledge invalidates the consent to be
searched).
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gers allows the officers to "capitalize on the ignorance of the citizens so as
to accomplish subterfuge.""'
Border patrol officers may assert that since they are operating under
the law of voluntary encounters and detention, there is no requirement
that they read passengers any rights before asking them for documents.14
However, because passengers of El Aguila are not informed of their right
to ignore the officers or walk away, the fact that passengers answer the
questions does not show a voluntary assent; rather it is a demonstration
of submission to authority.
146
As the Supreme Court has consistently held, submission to questioning
by border patrol officers does not establish voluntary consent.1 47 In Flor-
ida v. Royer,"4 the Court determined that when conducting a warrantless
search, the burden is on the officers to prove that consent was freely
given and not be shown by a passenger's mere submission to a claim of
authority.
149
3. No Particularized Suspicion
When boarding El Aguila, officers announce at the outset that they are
checking for illegal aliens and that everyone needs to get out their docu-
ments or get off the bus, which causes everyone to feel they are sus-
pects. 5° Officers demand documentation from everyone in the bus,"'1
notwithstanding the fact that most passengers are United States citizens
or legal permanent residents. 5 In United States v. Felder,153 the court
ruled that the police practice of boarding buses and randomly approach-
ing passengers, without particularized suspicion, violated the Fourth
Amendment.' 54 As such, border patrol officers violate the Fourth
144. See id. at 288.
145. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 277.
146. See United States v. Alexander, 755 F. Supp. 448, 451 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting that
when the passenger was asked why he did not walk away from officers, he replied, "I
couldn't.... I didn't know I could just walk away").
147. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 (1983); LA-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442
U.S. 319, 329 (1979); see also Sckneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233-34.
148. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
149. See i4. at 497.
150. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu. supra note 1; McRorie Interview with
Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2.
151. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1; MeRorie Interview with
Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2.
152. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1. From this, one may infer
that the other passengers were U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents. See id.
153. United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204 (D.D.C. 1990).
154. See id. 209 (stating that the police practice of questioning people at random with-
out articulable suspicion was "repugnant on the nation's constitutional values and safe-
guards" in the Fourth Amendment). See id. The Metropolitan Police Department's
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Amendment of the passengers when they deem everyone on board El
Aguila a suspect of illegal alienage without particularized suspicion.
In Mendoza v. INS,'55 the court condemned the "dragnet method" of
detention 156 because officers violated the rights of innocent people when
they did not limit interrogation to those individuals reasonably suspected
of being illegal aliens.' 57 In Mendoza, officers acting on old tips raided
three nightclubs simultaneously. 158 The agents in cooperation with local
police burst in unannounced, turned off the music, stopped bar service,
guarded the doors, and randomly interrogated the people in the bar.'5 9
The court found that the actions of the border patrol had resulted in a
seizure of everyone in the bar. 6° The court declared that officers needed
a warrant because their search required the detention of people as to
whom they had no individualized reasonable suspicion of illegal status. 6'
Likewise, stops of El Aguila also subject innocent United States citizens
and legal permanent residents to seizures when officers demand docu-
mentation from everyone without individualized suspicion.
4. Passengers are not "Free to Leave"
Even if passengers wanted to leave, they do not believe that they are
free to leave at anytime or free to refuse to cooperate.' 62 Not only does
the reasonable innocent person feel compelled to answer, 163 but also re-
fusing to respond or simply walking away subjects passengers to further
suspicion."6 Passengers aboard El Aguila stated that they never felt free
Narcotic Interdiction Unit had engaged in boarding buses and randomly questioning and
searching passengers on board the buses. See id. at 205. The court acknowledges that
although there was a drug epidemic, everyone who boarded an interstate bus was not to be
deemed a suspected drug courier. See id. at 209. See generally English v. Sava, 571 F.
Supp. 1029, 1039 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (finding that officers were allowed to question without
particular suspicion, as to each passenger, because they had already established reasonable
suspicion).
155. Mendoza v. INS, 559 F. Supp. 842 (1982).
156. See id. at 848 (noting the dragnet method "was used by the court to define the
sweep and over-inclusive questioning conducted by INS officers).
157. See id at 848-49.
158. See id at 844-45.
159. See id at 845.
160. See id. at 846.
161. See Mendoza v. INS, 559 F. Supp. 842, 849 (1982).
162. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1 (providing facts that would
lead a reasonable person to believe he was detained).
163. See Alexander, 755 F. Supp. at 453 (declaring the court's disagreement with deci-
sions holding that the reasonable innocent person being questioned in a populated public
bus would feel free to decline or walk away even if the path was open).
164. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1 (stating that he was
harassed when he refused to show documentation proving he was a United States citizen).
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to remain silent or to refuse to show documentation. 6 - One passenger
was hassled and insulted when he refused to show documentation proving
he was a United States citizen;"6 and another was told to get off the bus
because she was not carrying documentation confirming she was a United
States citizen. 67 Refusing to consent and show the appropriate docu-
ments only subjects them to further suspicion. Officers who carry out bus
sweeps acknowledge this heightened suspicion to be true.'
68
Using the "free to leave" test to determine consent is a justification by
the government and border patrol to violate the Fourth Amendment
rights of Americans who appear Mexican. However, this justification is
not sufficient for the seizure of the bus. Officers need to have some par-
ticularized suspicion that the person they are about to question is an ille-
gal alien. 169 The fact that a person looks Mexican is not indicative of
illegal alienage and does not give border patrol the right to approach a
person and question them about their citizenship.
B. Roving Patrols Violate the Reasonable Suspicion Standard
When roving patrol officers execute a seizure of the entire bus and de-
tain its occupants, they must be able to articulate factors relied upon for
making the stop and questioning all the occupants. 70 In determining
whether the officers met the standard of reasonable suspicion, a court
must look to the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to the
officer before executing the stop.1
7t
A vital element of the reasonable suspicion standard is that the officer
believes that the vehicle in question came from the border."2 Although
165. See id. (concluding that because the officers tell the passengers what to do, and
do not ask, the passengers believe they must comply); McRorie Interview with Mrs. Diaz,
supra note 2 (providing facts that would lead a passenger of El Aguila to feel they could
not refuse to comply).
166. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1.
167. See McRorie Interview with Mrs. Diaz, supra note 2.
168. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 447; see also Felder, 732 F. Supp. at 205 (D.D.C. 1990) (stat-
ing that officers testified that when passengers refuse to consent they take it upon them-
selves to notify the authorities at the next stop). See generally Babula v. INS, 665 F.2d 293,
298 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that if each person questioned chose to remain silent and refuse
to show documentation this would validate an agent's suspicion that the person is undocu-
mented); Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
169. See United States v. Chavez-Villarreal, 3 F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1993).
170. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975).
171. See United States v. Casteneda, 951 F.2d 44, 47 (5th Cir. 1992): see also United
States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d
592, 594 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must ascertain whether the factors relied
upon by the officers established the necessary suspicion to make the stop).
172. United States v. Moreno-Chaparro, 180 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Pallares-Pallares, 784 F.2d 1231, 1233 (5th Cir. 1986); Rodriguez, 76 F.2d at 747.
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the county bus has just come from an area close to the border, the pres-
ence in a border area "does not place the citizenry within a 'deconstitu-
tionalized zone'-.173 El Aguila operates on a regular route transporting
residents of the county from El Cenizo to worksites, supermarkets, and
clinics in Laredo, Texas. The county sets the bus route based on the
needs of the residents who are predominately United States citizens and
permanent residents.' 74 The fact that the bus begins its route close to the
border does not establish reasonable suspicion that the passengers are
undocumented persons.
There may be circumstances where a particular stop would not be in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. For example, when the border pa-
trol receives an anonymous tip that undocumented people have just
crossed the river and are attempting to go undetected by riding El Aguila
the circumstances may justify a stop of El Aguila. In English v. Sava,
175
the court found that an anonymous tip together with the officers cor-
roborating evidence, that there were large groups of West Indian persons
taking the bus, provided the suspicion to stop the bus and question its
occupants. 176 Courts find that the authenticity of the unknown informant
can be supported if the officer's own observations of some activity are
consistent with the tip, which would appear harmless without it.' 77 In the
stops of El Aguila, the fact that everyone is ordered to show documenta-
tion 78 discounts the possibility that officers are targeting a single person
or group and confirms that everyone is a suspect of being undocumented.
If the officers allege that they were following a specific passenger who
they believed to be undocumented, it is the duty of the officers to limit
the scope of an investigative detention to that necessary to dispel their
suspicion. 179 Therefore, an officer's over-inclusive questioning of all pas-
173. United States v. Newell, 506 F.2d 401, 405 (5th Cir. 1976); see also United States
v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 1999).
174. See McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2.
175. English v. Saug, 571 F.Supp 1029 (S.D. N.Y. 1983).
176. See id at 1042. In other cases the court has reaffirmed its position that an anony-
mous tip may be enough to establish reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Garcia-
Nunez, 709 F.2d 559, 561 (9th 1983) (finding that an anonymous tip which was substanti-
ated by neighbors was enough to establish reasonable suspicion); United States v. Nunn,
525 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1976) (finding that anonymous tip that indicated illegal aliens
would be found in the open bed of a two-tone late model Ford pick-up driven by two black
men, justified an investigatory stop).
177. See Bailey v. United States, 386 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S.
946 (1968).
178. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1 (noting that border patrol
demands documentation from every passenger in the bus).
179. See United States v. Soto-Cervantes, 138 F.3d 1319, 1322 (10th Cir. 1998); see
also United States v. Davis, 94 F. 3d 1465, 1468 (10th Cir. 1996) (describing an investigative
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sengers discounts the allegation that they have reasonable articulable sus-
picion to believe someone is undocumented.
Also, the Hispanic appearance of the passengers alone does not estab-
lish sufficient suspicion to lead the officers to believe the bus is transport-
ing undocumented people. The Court has long recognized that relatively
small numbers of individuals traveling on roads near the border are ille-
gal."~ With the growing increase in lawful immigration,"'1 Hispanic ap-
pearance has become even less probative of illegal alienage and should
detention as a seizure of limited scope and duration); English v. Sava, 571 F. Supp. 1029,
1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
180. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873. 886 (1975).
181. The following three acts account for much of the increase in the numbers of legal
permanent residents from Mexico: 1) 1965 elimination of quotas; 2) Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA's); legalization, and 3) the Immigration Act of 1990 (IM-
MACT7 90). Family immigration prioritized reunification of temporarily divided families
since the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. See LEauo'tsKY, supra note 22 at 131.
However, it was the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1965 which re-
pealed the national-origin quotas and initiated a seven-category visa system for family uni-
fication and skills that actually aided numbers of immigrants to reunite with families
lawfully in the United States. See THE NEw AMERICANS: EcoNoMIc, DE.MOGRAPnIC AND
FiscAL EFFECTs OF IMMIGRATION 28 (1997) (noting that the preference system caused
80% of the numerical limits to be allocated to United States family members). The modifi-
cations in immigration admissions provided for in IRCA and IMMACT 90 also increased
the number of legitimate immigrants as well as the number of naturalized citizens. See id.
at 28. See generally LEGOMSKY, supra note 22 at 1040 (citing to the 1994 STAnSCAL
YEARBOOK, Table 45 for the years 1992, 1993. and 1994). The number of filings per year
rose readily from 342,000 to 522,000 to 543,000. See id. One of IRCA's overall objectives
was to decrease the number of undocumented immigrants residing in the United States.
See INMMGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUsIMCE, IMM!.
GRATION REFORM AND CONTROL Ac-r REPORT ON THE LEGAUZED AUEN POPULATION.
(1991); LEGOMSKY, supra note 22. at 499 (stating that one of IRCA's ways of reducing the
undocumented immigrant, population was legalization, also known as amnesty). IRCA's
principle program provided for legalization of undocumented immigrants who lived in the
United States continuously since January 1, 1982. providing 2.65 million immigrants with
legal permanent residency. See id. at 500 (affirming that certain aliens who had been resid-
ing unlawfully in the United States for several years were allowed to regularize their status
to permanent residence). By providing 2.65 million immigrants with permanent residency,
IRCA thereby initiated a chain of eligibility for additional family members. See Cecilia
Espenoza, The Illusory Provisions of Sanctions: The Immigration Reformn and Control Act
of 1986, 8 GEO. IMMIGRA. L.J. 343, 354 (1994) (noting that many of those individuals were
subsequently allowed to remain in the United States while their applications were pending
under provisions which were known as family unity). Lastly, the IMMACT 90 increased
the immigrant labor force when it continued the policy of family unification by granting an
unlimited number of visas for immediate relatives, but more importantly, increasing the
number for priority workers and professionals raising the annual immigrant cap from the
260,000 annual limit to 700,000. See id. at 354-55.
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not be used to justify a stop.182 Moreover, statistics reflect that 98.8% of
colonia residents are Hispanic; 83 and two thirds of colonia residents were
born in the United States."8 Due to the increasing number of United
States citizens and legal permanent residents of Hispanic descent, His-
panic appearance cannot alone be deemed a relevant factor under the
reasonable suspicion standard.1
85
Finally, previous experience with alien traffic and information about
recent illegal crossings are two other factors that a court must weigh in
deciding whether roving patrol stops were justified in stopping a vehi-
cle. 18 6 Border patrol may allege that a number of persons cross the bor-
der near El Cenizo and use the county bus because it is a convenient,
inexpensive option to travel to the nearest city. Nonetheless, in United
States v. Rodriguez,'87 the court found that the combined factors of His-
panic appearance, a heavily loaded vehicle, and the use of a notorious
smuggling route were not enough to rise to the level of reasonable suspi-
cion."" These factors were not enough because they could potentially be
used to describe too many innocent motorists.189 Thus, factors such as
extraordinary number of passengers, driver's behavior, and appearance
182. See United States v. Espinoza Montero-Camargo, 2000 U.S. App. LExis 6494
(concluding that due to the changes in ethnic and racial appearance, Hispanic appearance
is not an appropriate factor in determining reasonable articulable suspicion). In the past
two decades, because Hispanics have become one of the fastest growing ethnic groups in
the nation, appearance alone can no longer be associated with illegal alienage. See Or-
lando Rodriguez, The New Immigrant Hispanic Population: An Integrated Approach to
Preventing Delinquency and Crime (visited Jan. 2000) <http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/his-
pop.txt > [hereinafter Orlando Rodriguez] (stating that Hispanics increased 50% between
1980 and 1990 and now make up nine percent of today's population); see also THE NEw
AMERICANS, supra note 181, at 115 (projecting the impact of immigration on the United
States population). The bipartisan Commission on Immigration Reform found that in the
year 2050, the Hispanic population would rise to 95 million or about 1 in 4 of the popula-
tion. See id.
183. Colonias Factbook Summary (visited Mar. 20, 2000) <http://chud.tamu.edu/
colonias/factbook.html> [hereinafter Colonias Factbook Summary].
184. Id. The factbook also points out that the other 39.1 are foreign born. See id.
Foreign born encompasses a wide range of persons from legal permanent residents, person
awaiting visas, persons who have overstayed their visas, to undocumented persons.
185. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 885-87; Johnson, supra note 45, at 14; Victor H.
Polmierie, Preface to FRANK BEAN, ET AL., OPENING AND CLOSING THE DOORS, EVALtU-
ATING IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL at xv (1989); see also Robert Stacy McCain,
Minorities to Account for Most of Future U.S. Population, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1999, at
A10 (stating that immigration has been the contributing factor for over one-third of the
increase in the minority population since 1980 and more specifically, 40 percent of the
Hispanic growth).
186. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884-85.
187. United States v. Rodriguez, 976 F.2d 592 (1992).
188. See id. at 594-96.
189. See id. at 595.
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of the vehicle do not establish suspicion since they are necessary for the
operation of the bus and describe innocent behavior.
C. Stop of El Aguila and Detention of Its Occupants Is an
Unreasonable Seizure
Because roving patrol officers stop El Aguila without reasonable suspi-
cion that the bus is carrying undocumented persons, then question its oc-
cupants without particularized suspicion of alienage, the stop is an
unreasonable seizure."9 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that when
officers have seized an individual, the Fourth Amendment requires that
the seizure be reasonable.' 91 Determining the reasonableness of a
seizure, which involves a brief detention, turns "on a balance between the
public interest and the individuals right to personal security free from
arbitrary interference by law officers." 192
In Brown v. Texas,'93 the Court found that officers had seized the ap-
pellant when they detained him for the purpose of requiring him to iden-
tify himself.' 9 4 When the officers observed appellant and another man in
an alley known for high incidence of drug traffic, they decided to stop the
appellant.195 The officers did not claim that the appellant was a suspect
of specific misconduct, but rather that he looked suspicious, since he had
never been seen in the area.196 When appellant refused to identify him-
self, he was arrested for refusing to give his name and address to an of-
ficer when lawfully stopped and requested for information. 7 The Court
found that the factors relied upon by the officers did not amount to rea-
sonable suspicion because appellant's activity was no different from any
other pedestrian.' 98 In the absence of reasonable suspicion, the balance
tips in favor of the appellant's right to personal security and freedom
from governmental intrusion. 199
When considering the constitutionality of a seizure involving a brief
detention, the Supreme Court in Brown established a balancing test. 200
190. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 881-882 (stating that reasonable suspicion re-
quires officers to be aware of specific articulable facts that a particular vehicle contains
illegal aliens); Rodriguez, 976 F.2d at 594 (finding that officers cannot stop a motorist with-
out a particularized basis for suspecting them of criminal activity).
191. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50 (1979).
192. See Pennsylvania v. Mims, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); Brown, 443 U.S. at 50.
193. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
194. See id. at 50.
195. See id. at 48-49.
196. See id. at 49.
197. See id. at 48-49.
198. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 52.
199. See id. at 52.
200. See id. at 50-51.
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The test weighed the gravity of the public interest served by the seizure,
the extent to which the seizures furthered the public concern, and the
severity of the interference with individual's right to be free from govern-
mental intrusion." 1 Although the Court found that the Texas statute was
designed to advance a significant social objective, the prevention of
crime, the degree to which it furthered that purpose was uncertain.2"
Moreover, the intrusion of stopping individuals without suspicion that
they are is engaged in criminal activity, is a subjective police practice that
exceeds the acceptable limits of the Fourth Amendment. 0 3
In determining the constitutionality of the bus seizures at hand, the
court must weigh the governmental concern against the privacy interest
of the individual being seized using the Brown test. First, a court must
determine the public concern served by seizures of El Aguila and the
questioning of its occupants. 204 Because El Aguila buses are only
stopped between El Cenizo and Laredo,2 5 one can infer that the public
interest being served by these seizures is to apprehend and deter undocu-
mented immigrants who have crossed the river near El Cenizo and use
the bus to travel undetected.2 °6 Second, the court must evaluate to what
extent seizures of El Aguila further this public concern. 2 7 Information
pertaining to the stops reveals that few persons were arrested following
the seizures.20 8 We do not know if the persons arrested were residents of
El Cenizo and Rio Bravo, and were using the bus to travel to work; or if
the persons had recently crossed the river, and were using El Aguila to
get to Laredo undetected. However, we know that the other passengers,
United States citizens and permanent residents were permitted to con-
tinue to their destinations following the thirty-minute stop.20 9 Third, we
must weigh this severe governmental practice against the interests of
United States citizens and legal permanent residents detained and ques-
tioned.210 The intrusion is great. Random seizures subject innocent resi-
dents of El Cenizo and Rio Bravo to unwarranted police harassment,
201. See id.
202. See id. at 52.
203. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979).
204. See id. at 51 (presenting the factors that must be weighed, the first, which was the
concern of the public interest advanced by the seizures).
205. See McRorie Interview with Jose Gamez, supra note 2.
206. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 878.
207. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (delineating the second factor as the degree to which
the seizures advance the public interest).
208. See McRorie Interview with Mr. Cantu, supra note 1 (noting that only two or
three people were arrested following the stops by border patrol).
209. See id.
210. See Brown, 443 U.S. at 51 (delineating the third factor of the balancing test as the
severity of the interference with individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion).
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interference of movement, and consumption of time. All controvert the
safeguards of the Fourth Amendment of Constitution. Those lawfully in
the United States are at liberty to utilize the public highways.211 As such,
they have a right to travel without interruption unless it is clear to the
officer that the vehicle contains undocumented persons.212
As in Brown, the intrusion on United States citizens and legal perma-
nent residents occasioned by these stops outweighs the government's
need to apprehend individuals attempting to violate immigration laws.
Moreover, the government's need to enforce immigration laws does not
justify the manner in which they seize United States citizens and perma-
nent residents on board El Aguila. Border patrol's practice of boarding
buses at a location other than the international border or checkpoints and
questioning passengers without articulable suspicion violates the Fourth
Amendment as it subjects innocents to unreasonable seizures, notwith-
standing their right to travel free from governmental intrusion.
VI. SETTING UP A CIVILIAN REVIEw BOARDS AT
U.S.-MExIco BORDER
Since border patrol officers have engaged in practices that violate the
Fourth Amendment rights of United States citizens and legal permanent
residents, it is necessary to determine where we go from here. An in-
dependent regional Civilian Review Board, which is already entrusted
with the task of police officer accountability in many communities,
213
should be established to monitor the practices of INS and provide an in-
termediary complaint structure for local communities. A Civilian Review
Board would offer a practical method of restraining officer discretion and
improving the legitimacy of roving patrols.214 Although such procedures
have been recommended on a local basis in the past, 15 INS has resisted
their establishment.216
211. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1973).
212. See id. at 274.
213. See Sean Hecker, Race and Pretextual Traffic Stops: An Expanded Role for Civil-
ian Review Boards, 28 COLUM. HUm. RTS. L. REv. 551, 593 (1997).
214. See generally id.
215. See Jesus A. Trevino, Comment. Border Violence Against Illegal Immigrants and
the Need to Change The Border Patrol's Current Complaint Review Process, 21 Hous. 1.
INT'L L. 85, 99 (1998) (relating that Human Rights Watch-America, a national civil rights
group, Senator DeConcini, and U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform were among
some to propose and support the creation of an independent citizen's review panel); Lee J.
Teran, Obtaining Remedies for INS Misconduct, IMMIOR. BmEniNos, May 1996 at 1, 14
(noting the Court's imposition of various review procedures to curb continued violations).
216. See Lee J. Teran, supra note 215. at 18: Jesus A. Trevino, supra note 215, at 99
(recognizing that INS and Border Patrol strongly opposed the passage of a civilian review
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A. Function of Civilian Review Agencies
The Civilian Review Board is a concept that started in the late 1950's
and has become increasingly accepted to improve relations between po-
lice and the communities in which they operate. 217 A Civilian Review
Board is an external procedure employed to handle citizen complaints
against police officer misconduct. 218 In addition, an independent review
process monitors internal policies and procedures and recommends
changes.2 19 The civilian review agencies vary in structure from a multiple
board to a single director22 0 and from total independent citizens to the
involvement of sworn officers.22'
B. The Current Available Remedies
At this time, a citizen who has been unlawfully stopped may choose to
file a grievance with the local border patrol agency; or, if the practice
subjects a class of people to unlawful stops, they may bring a class-action
suit to enjoin the INS practices.2 2
1. Injunctive Relief
In the past, the INS has been enjoined through a class action suit "from
stopping, questioning, and detaining individuals without reasonable suspi-
cion of illegal presence in the United States. ''2 ' However, filing injunc-
tive relief is considered an "extraordinary and drastic remedy" by the
courts, which should only be awarded when the plaintiff clearly carries
the burden of proof2 24 Moreover, because bringing injunctive relief
board claiming that outside interference would infringe on the agency's right to due pro-
cess and that there was no need for the review board).
217. See Hecker, supra note 213, at 594 (stating that the majority of large cities now
have civilian review agencies and a rising number of small cities are implementing them as
well).
218. See id. at 593.
219. See id. at 594-95.
220. See id. at 594 (noting that "eighty-two percent of civilian review agencies involve
multimember [agencies], while [eleven percent] are organized under a single director").
221. See id. at 595.
222. See generally Lee J. Teran, supra note 215, at 14.
223. Id. at 14; see also Murillo v. Musegades, 809 F. Supp. 487, 498 (1992) (noting that
plaintiffs of Hispanic descent have been questioned, detained and searched without cause,
and thus have a right to bring a cause of action); Nicacio v. INS, 797 F.2d 700, 704 (1986)
(relating the court's decision to enjoin INS practice of stopping vehicles affecting persons
of Hispanic descent); Illinois Migrant Council v. Pilliod, 540 F.2d 1062, 1072 (7th Cir.
1976), modified, 548 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (concerning migrant workers who
were successful in enjoining the INS from stopping and searching class members based on
their appearance).
224. See Murillo, 809 F. Supp. at 497.
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against the INS requires enormous costs associated with litigation and the
availability of counsel willing and able to pursue a federal lawsuit, many
people injured by unconstitutional actions are not able to pursue
litigation.' z
2. Filing a Complaint
Because filing suit to enjoin the actions of INS officers is difficult to
obtain, filing an administrative complaint, and requesting that a particular
officer be reprimanded or that the INS investigate the procedures being
executed by its officers, may be the only feasible remedy. " 6 Yet, the cur-
rent complaint procedure is ineffective in documenting, investigating, or
resolving complaints." 7 Currently, three separate offices, with remarka-
bly general guidelines as to the procedure to be followed, handle com-
plaints.' z Depending on the nature of the Complaint, the Office of the
Inspector General receives the complaints and either retains them or
routes them to the Office of Professional Responsibility or Office of In-
ternal Audit for investigation." 9 However, the investigators themselves
do not have a clear idea about which offices have which obligations.3
Moreover, many people feel that filing a grievance is a futile attempt to
resolve the INS misconduct." 1 Others fear that if they complain, INS
225. See Lee J. Teran, supra note 215, at 17.
226. See id at 14.
227. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, Keeping an Eye on the I.N.S.: A Case for Civdian
Review of Uncivil Conduct, 7 LA RAZA L.. 1, 9-10 (1994) (asserting that the current com-
plaint procedure is ineffectual); see also Cap Reconunends Improved Complaint Proce-
dures, 75 Interpreter Releases 303, 303 (1998).
228. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, supra note 227, at 10 (noting that complaints are
currently being handled by the Justice Department's Office of Professional Responsibility,
the Officer of Inspector General, and by the Office of Internal Audit); see also Cap Recom-
mends Improved Complaint Procedures, INTERPRETER RELEAsEs, Mar. 2, 1998, at 285, 303
(finding that the complaint procedure is cumbersome, requiring the three offices to be
involved that have different missions and priorities making it difficult to investigate and
resolve the complaints).
229. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, supra note 227, at 10-11.
230. See id 11.
231. See Lee J. Teran, supra note 215, at 17 (stating that people do not file complaints
believing these to be ineffective); Amnesty International, United State of America: Human
Rights Concerns in the Border Region with Merico (visited Apr. 3, 2000)
<http.www.amnesty.orgailib/aipub/1998/AMR/25100398.htm> [hereinafter Amnesty In-
ternational] (relating the case of Bowie High School, where legal permanent residents
were frequently harassed and ill-treated by Border Patrol agents, but seldom protested
against their treatment because they feared reprisals and believed that the complaints were
futile). See generally Maggie Rivas, Judge Rules Border Patrol tolated Rights at El Paso
School, TiH DALLAS MonnIo NEws, Dec. 4, 1992, at 22B (quoting a Bowie High School
Alumnus that grew up thinking that there was nothing that could be done when Hispanics
were stopped by Border Patrol agents).
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will take repercussions against them or family members who might be
undocumented or awaiting visas.
3 2
a. CAP-Citizens Advisory Panel
In an attempt to resolve the purportedly ineffective complaint proce-
dure, Congress instituted the Citizens Advisory Panel (CAP).233 CAP is
a national agency, comprised of private citizens and government employ-
ees appointed by the Attorney General. 34 CAP aimed to provide a fo-
rum for advocates to present new initiatives, report INS abuses, and
create solutions for an operative complaint system.3 5 CAP recognized
that cultural concerns formed part of the setbacks of the complaint proce-
dure." 6 The cultural problems include: "language barriers, community
literacy, perceptions of intimidation or retaliation directed at complaints,
and previous experience with government agencies." 7 CAP advised the
distribution of information regarding border patrol's power and limita-
tions as to its procedures,23 and proposed to work with local communi-
ties in implementing a course for INS staff to be given by the local
organizations. 239
C. Creation of the Civilian Review Board
The establishment of a border Civilian Review Board will aid CAP at
the local level in managing the review process and implementing the de-
sired programs. 24° A Citizens Review Board will have the authority to
examine problems, recommend disciplinary action for officers engaged in
232. See Lee J. Teran, supra note 215, at 17 (noting that other people do not file a
complaint out of fear of INS agents); Cap Recommends Improved Complaint Procedures,
supra note 227, at 303 (finding that among problems with current complaint system was the
fear of retaliation and intimidation).
233. See Jesus A. Trevino, supra note 215, at 99 (noting that the citizens advisory
panel was suggested as an answer to charges against the Border Patrol).
234. Established in 1994, and empanelled in April 1995, with 13 voting members ap-
pointed by the Attorney General. See Lee J. Teran, supra note 215, at 18. These voting
members include four U.S. governmental officials and nine private sectors individuals, in-
cluding immigration and civil rights advocates. See id; Cap Recommends Improved Com-
plaint Procedures, supra note 227, at 303.
235. See id.
236. See Cap Recommends Improved Complaint Procedures, supra note 227, at 303.
237. Id.
238. See id. (recommending that INS distribute materials that define officer's limita-
tions on regulations, such as, firearm use, searches, etc.).
239. See id.
240. See generally Stephen A. Rosenbaum, supra note 227, at 18 (noting that civilian
review board is essential at the local level to make the review process more effective).
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suspect practices, and recommend changes in policy and procedures af-
fecting the local residents, while also keeping the community informed.41
1. Features of the Civilian Review Board
The Civilian Review Board may be established by a "city ordinance,
state statute, voter referendum, mayoral executive order, or police chief
administrative orders. 2 42 The ability to institute the revised review pro-
cess at a regional level is essential to its manageability.243 Since border
patrol sectors are set up in regions, the civilian review board would also
operate in regions with CAP as the centralized body of the region
chapters.
The Civilian Review Board would function in the following manner.
The City Council or Mayor of the colonias or cities in each sector shall
appoint the board members to the Civilian Review Board. The Civilian
Review Board may consist of a small number of members, not to exceed
ten, which would be appointed for one-year terms and eligible for re-
selection not exceeding three years. The Civilian Review Board would be
outfitted with an attorney who is able to provide information about the
rights of residents against border patrol practices while assisting the
board members in recommendations to INS.
2. Intermediary in the Complaint Process
A Civilian Review Board would be able to provide a responsive intake,
for all residents who have complaints. Providing an intermediary struc-
ture between INS and the residents, the Civilian Review Board would
document the initial intake and deliver it to INS along with its recom-
mendation for disciplinary action of the officer or its perspective on the
INS procedure. Moreover, the Civilian Review Board will provide a
place to keep records of complaints, both providing accessibility to the
residents making the complaints, as well as to CAP and attorneys looking
to monitor patterns of abusive and unlawful stopping in communities like
El Cenizo. Instituting such procedures would lessen the work where liti-
gation may ensue.
241. See generally Hecker, supra note 213. at 596 (stating that review boards conduct
public hearings on individual complaints and informs residents via an annual report regard-
ing complaints and resolutions); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, supra note 227, at 16 (noting the
purposes of citizens review boards). Specifically, the Board will serve to identify and pun-
ish the officers engaged in unlawful conduct, give aggrieved parties the means to redress,
and act as a deterrent for future misconduct. See id.
242. Sean Hecker, supra note 213, at 594.
243. See Stephen A. Rosenbaum, supra note 227, at 23 (noting that a centralized body
will not work because of the large size of INS). Therefore, local agencies are needed to
make it manageable under a decentralized administration. See id.
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3. Provide Information and Education to Residents
In addition to the aforementioned complaint procedure, the Civilian
Review Board would publish and circulate the latest information about
complaints and their ultimate disposition in a monthly newsletter. 2" The
board would provide the complainant with information including any sta-
tus, change, or disposition made by INS.24 5 Moreover, the distribution of
statistical information related to complaints received and their final dis-
position, would keep residents informed about problems with INS
procedures.
The information presented in the monthly reports also would serve to
educate the residents about border patrol's authority and limitations
under the Fourth Amendment and case law.246 Additionally, the reports
would also provide education about asserting certain rights; for instance,
the right to remain silent or the right to walk away in certain situations.
Ultimately, the intervention of an external citizens review board vali-
dates the concerns of citizens, particularly in minority communities along
the border.247 The regional structure would serve as a voice for all His-
panics who find themselves unreasonably stopped. The citizens review
board would corroborate the notion that border patrol practices must
conform to the Fourth Amendment's limitations because "a citizen's con-




Congress' power to exclude illegal aliens cannot be interpreted so
broadly as to limit Fourth Amendment rights to persons legally in the
United States. Citizens and legal permanent residents near the border
should not be encumbered with the intrusion, harassment, and embar-
rassment of being asked whether they have 'papers' simply because of the
color of their skin or the place they chose to reside.
244. See id. at 26 (stating that an important feature of the civilian review board is
disseminating information about the status of complaints).
245. See id. at 25 (stating that the civilian review board must provide up-to-date infor-
mation for complaintant).
246. See Cap Recommends Improved Complaint Procedures, supra note 227, at 303
(noting that information should be distributed regarding officer's authority to "use of fire-
arms, use of force, vehicular pursuits, searches, site inspections, and power to arrest, inter-
rogate, and detain").
247. See Hecker, supra note 213, at 600 (recognizing that fear runs rampant in the
minority community, that law enforcement will fail to respond to allegations of discrimina-
tory practices runs rampant amongst the minority community).
248. United States v. Felder, 732 F. Supp. 204, 209 (1990).
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"The thought that an American can be compelled to 'show his papers'
before exercising his right to walk the streets, drive the highways or board
the trains is repugnant to American institutions and ideals. '2 49 It is the
"freedom of movement [that] is the very essence of our free society" en-
joyed in the United States."s
249. State ex rel. Ekstrom v. Justice Court of State of Arizona, 663 P.2d 992. 997
(Ariz. 1983) (Feldman, J. concurring).
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